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Introduction – last philosophy
The horizon of death – whether imminent or delayed – transforms all values.
In  his  diverse  writings  on  both  theology and  philosophy and  through  a
creative  re-reading  of  thinkers  such  as  Heidegger  and  Husserl,  the
phenomenologist  and  theologian  Jean-Luc  Marion  outlines  his  wish  to
return to what he regards as a truly Husserlian phenomenology, and one, this
essay will contend, that has death at its centre. Starting from the notion of
the ‘es gibt’ (‘there is’) in Heidegger, Marion emphasizes Husserl’s notion
of  phenomena  as  being  the  ‘giver’  to  consciousness,  translating  this
givenness  as  ‘donation’.  Thus  phenomena become gifts  to  consciousness
and Marion shows a concern for the gift that is central to the thinking of his
former teacher Derrida. It embraces Levinas’ reading of Husserl as having
suppressed the ‘otherness’ of phenomena and his own re-emphasis upon the
transcendence of the other, such that it shatters our  logos and comes to us
unmediated. Nowhere is this transcendence more evident for Marion than in
the ultimate gift, Christ the Logos, and whilst Janicaud and others argue that
Husserl specifically disallowed God as a subject of phenomenology, Marion
counters that this bracketing only excludes the philosophers’ idolatrous God
of onto-theo-ology (2001, p.18), not the self-communicating and loving God
of  revealed  theo-logy.  In  mapping  out  a  phenomenology of  love  and  a
phenomenology of the  gift  of  that  love  as  ‘being  given as  givenness’,  a
condition  of  life  itself,  he  proposes  a  first  philosophy  befitting  a  last
philosophy (Marion, 2002, p.27). This essay will show how, throughout the
genealogy of Marion’s thought and that of the thinkers that have influenced
it,  whenever  he  speaks  of  the  gift,  its  dialectical  shadow-side,  death,  is
present.
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Death in the thought of Karl Rahner
In taking seriously the pluralistic, contextual, and interdisciplinary nature of
theology, Rahner anticipated many of the themes that occupy postmodernity.
In its insistence that our language about God is inadequate, if not idolatrous,
and its revival of the apophatic tradition, it advocates, like Rahner before it,
a new, more tentative, speech about God. Rahner has been accused of being
‘fascinated  by death’  (Ochs,  1969,  p.14).  His  writings  on the  subject  of
death as a universal  phenomenon affecting the person as a whole map a
tension between the particular, concrete, and changing (the categorical) and
the changeless structures of human consciousness (the transcendental). Thus
his use of the notion of vorgriff auf esse recognises that in our dealings with
the world we are also always dealing with God. Our dealings with God are
also through our dealings with the world; our apprehension of an object,
will, or value is never mere recognition or choice but a reaching beyond it
and through to the whole of being. Indeed, it is only because of this pre-
apprehension that we can choose or recognise – the  vorgriff auf esse is a
transcendental  condition of all  our knowing and willing. Rahner borrows
from Heidegger the notion of infinite being as an ever present and necessary
background, the horizon for our knowledge of finite things; from Aquinas
the idea of this vorgriff as a light that in illuminating the individual allows
us  to  understand;  and  from  Maréchal  the  notion  that  our  being  and
dynamism is striving towards God such that the mind, never satisfied,  is
always moving beyond the particular. 
Rahner can claim that ‘the achieved final validity of human existence
which has grown to maturity in freedom’ comes to be through, not after,
death:
What  has  come  to  be  is  the  liberated,  final  validity  of
something that which was once temporal, and which came to
be in spirit and in freedom, and which therefore formed time in
order  to  be  and not  really in  order  to  continue  on  in  time.
(1978, p.437)
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Death is therefore a moment of profound summation and integration in the
life of each person, which confronts them as a mystery that underlines the
reality of human finitude, limitation, dependence, and freedom and, insofar
as Rahner understands it,  demands a response from all  – either in wilful
resistance or trusting surrender, a reflection of their own response to that
original  Mystery (here denoting the  divine  mysterion,  the  original  Greek
word first rendered as ‘sacrament’ by Tertullian). This free choice to live
either autonomously or theonomously is repeated throughout the lifetime as
a constant  dialectic  in  which every positive moral  choice  is  an event  of
theonomous death and a lifetime of free moral actions represents a personal
self-disposal toward God, ratified at death. Theonomous death is thus both
an act of freedom (Rahner, 1972, p.92) and an act of Grace, for as the fullest
self-communication  of  God,  it  is  the  Grace  of  Christ  that,  as  one
existentially open to divine self-communication, exposes the hearer of the
word.
The full meaning of human death is therefore only appreciated in the
light  of  the  death  of  Jesus  Christ,  illustration  ad extra of  death  as  both
passion and action, natural and personal, and ‘there is an identity between
the experience of the Spirit and the participation in the victorious death of
Jesus,  in  which  alone  the  real  success  of  our  death  is  experienced  and
experienced within a believing community’ (Rahner, 1984, p.206).
With  death  thus  rooted  in  the  existential  experience,  Rahner  is
concerned to dissociate death from the original sin recorded in scripture: 
The  biblical  story  about  the  sin  of  the  first  person  or  first
persons  in  no  way  has  to  be  understood  as  an  historical
eyewitness report. The portrayal of the sin of the first man is
rather an aetiological inference from the experience of man’s
existentiell [sic]  situation in the history of salvation to what
must have happened ‘at the beginning’ if the present situation
of freedom actually is  the way it  is  experienced and if  it  is
accepted as it is. (1978, p.114)
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Whilst the exercise of our freedom occurs in a history bound by (original)
sin and self-communication (‘supernatural existential’), the penal character
of death as punishment for sin is veiled in  die Verhülltheit die Todes, that
uncertainty as to whether one ultimately dies to fulfilment or emptiness.
For  Rahner,  accounts  of  the  resurrection  of  the  body  and  the
immortality of the soul are parallel statements that arise from different ways
of speaking of the human (1966, p.352). Death ‘puts an end to the  whole
man’(1966, p.347) as the unique combination of that original gift of spirit,
embodied and organised in the self and orientated toward God, called to live
teleolologically  within  that  gift.  But,  whilst  at  death  that  self  loses  its
previous organizational control, in the hope offered in the life, death, and
Resurrection of Jesus Christ it anticipates a gracious act of restoration not to
its  earthly  form  but  to  a  new  organization  within  a  radically  new
eschatological liberty. Thus Rahner can affirm that: 
We do not mean that ‘things go on’ after death, as though we
have only changed horses, as Feuerbach puts it,  and rode on
[…].  Eternity is  not  an  immeasurably long lasting mode of
pure time, but a mode of the spirit and freedom. (1966, p.347-
348)
In later reflection Rahner noted that:
The conceptual models used to clarify what is meant by eternal
life are for the most part insufficient to deal with the radical
break that takes place at death […]. The angels of death will
gather up all that trivia that we call our history from the rooms
of our spirit (though, of course, the true essence of our active
freedom will remain). The starry ideals which we have rather
presumptuously adorned the higher spheres of life will  have
faded away […]. Death will have erected a huge, silent void.
And we will have accepted this state in a spirit of faith and
hope as corresponding to our destiny and being. (2000, p.14-
15)
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Death then, for Rahner, is a personal act  embodying our personhood and
freedom and our responsibility of love and faithfulness. It is enmeshed with
freedom, time, and eternity not as liberum arbitrium but as our capacity to
realise and determine ourselves in a definitive way (libertas) before God as
a horizon of absolute Goodness. Our freedom is exercised in history and
therefore connected with time – our internal time enables us to exercise that
freedom. It is death that makes that freedom and thereby gives it its meaning
by ending it.  The end of our time in freedom is definitive and final and
marks the passing of our own process of becoming.
The ‘death’ of Jacques Derrida
It was inevitable that, perhaps by default, long discussion of différance and
absence would yield death as the dominant theme in Derrida’s writing, one
that  includes  concepts  such  as  absence,  finitude,  sous  rature,  ‘the  end’,
closure, and non-presence. Death, following Ricoeur, is thus the maternal
metaphor in a family of related metaphors of negation that Derrida uses,
such as khora, aporia, and chiasmus. Derrida uses this analysis of death and
its related metaphors to explore ‘the other’ of a traditional metaphysics that
is always grounded in the positive presence of life, be it in the thought of
Plato,  Husserl (who grounds phenomenality in life), or Heidegger (whose
humanism depends on a particular determination of Dasein). 
Derrida  unearths  the  paradox  at  the  heart  of  Husserl’s  explicit
presupposition  of  lebendige  Gegenwart –  the  necessary condition  of  the
absolute presence of non-presence in that living present which recognises
death as a phenomenal certainty. This present is thus always deconstructed
by an irreducible alterity and our life is characterised by secondariness and
contingency; the general economy of life that, for Husserl, was irreducible to
any  one  individual  is,  for  Derrida,  an  economy  of  the  alterity  of  his
neologism ‘la vie la mort’ (1973, p259). For the otherwise transcendental
Ich this alterity is represented most strikingly by the appearance of the other,
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which for Derrida marks the appearance of death, since ‘[a]s soon as the
other appears, indicative language – another name for the relation with death
– can no longer be effaced’ (1973, p.40).
Therefore,  in  a  metaphysics  so  associated  with  life  and  identity,
death  represents  an  ‘excluded alternative’  (Rayment-Pickard,  2003,  p.18)
which although repressed by its structures is nonetheless essential to it. This
meditation  upon  death,  the  contemplation  of  this  repressed  other,
undermines  that  metaphysics.  So,  rooted  in  these  conditions  of
impossibility, the quest for absolute life, for Derrida at least, collapses in the
play of life and death (1973, p.102).
Derrida’s theology, it could therefore be argued, is one which moves
between life and death, between a theology of the metaphysics of presence
and its own repressed other: the theology of the death of God. The theology
of différance means that: 
God is or appears, is named, within the difference between All
and Nothing, Life and Death. Within Difference, and at bottom
as Difference itself. This 
difference  is  what  is  called  History.  God is  inscribed  in  it.
(1978, p.116)
Death  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  reversal  of  Husserl  offered  by
Heidegger  (1987,  p.131),  to  which  Derrida  is  indebted.  Husserl’s
phenomenology is  determined by the  intrinsic  meaning of  conscious  life
within an environment of intentional objects but by contrast, in Heidegger’s
work it is the death of the self that makes the existential conception of the
Kantian  subject  possible  (2000,  p.308).  Death  is  only  an  observable
phenomenon but  zum Tode sein is an entirely personal act, a unique and
personal responsibility that  clarifies the sense of being itself and without
which  Dasein’s life is both meaningless and inconceivable. This is not an
awareness of a temporal event, but an orientation toward non-being as an
often repressed, possible alternative that we experience as the ontological
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angst (Befindlichkeit) of non-existence, and which provides the ontological
ground of care.
The Icon of Death
As Milbank noted (1995, p.138), in  L’Idole et la Distance (Marion, 2001),
Marion distanced himself from Levinas’ discussion of l’autrui by reference
to the notion of gift found in Heidegger’s later writings. There he seems to
construe the latter’s  notion of  Ereignis as  establishing a genuine  kenotic
‘distance’ between Being and beings which superseded Heidegger’s earlier
tendency to  fold  the  two  together,  such  that  ontic  presence  was  finally
‘appropriated’ through the ineffable and temporal unfolding of Being itself.
Therefore, for Marion, the ontological difference was a trace of the distance
between the Father and Son, with the giving of the first occurring within the
ever-yet-greater distance of the second.
In  God  Without  Being  Marion uses  a  deconstructive  critique  of
idolatry to  outline a theology of Christ  as  ‘icon of the invisible  God’,  a
restricted theology that resists the attempt to reduce the divine aoratos to a
visible image, an idol that subjects the divine to ‘the measure of a human
gaze’ (1991, p.14) or human concepts such as Being. The divine invisibility
is the other of visibility, from a separate order of phenomenality:
The icon shows, strictly speaking, nothing […]. It teaches the
gaze […] to find in infinity something new. The icon summons
the gaze to surpass itself by never freezing on a visible, since
the visible only presents itself here in view of the invisible. The
gaze  can never  rest  or  settle  if  it  looks  at  an  icon;  it  must
always rebound upon the visible […] the icon makes visible
only by giving rise to an infinite gaze. (1991, p.18)
Whereas the ‘idol results from the gaze that aims at it, the icon summons
sight in letting the visible […] be saturated little by little with the invisible’
(1991, p.17). So it is that the ‘crossing out of God’s being utilizes the logic
of  the  trace:  God is  a  presence  that  precisely in  being present  points  to
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something that is  absent’,  (Benson, 2002, p.197) and  God who in giving
‘offers the only accessible trace of He who gives’ (Marion, 1991, p.105).
Scripture therefore can only provide us with a trace of Christ, non-presence
never his  full  presence,  thus defying what  Marion considers Heidegger’s
own  idolatry in  subjecting  God  Himself  to  Dasein’s category of  Being.
Marion therefore insists on translating Husserl’s Gegebenheit as ‘donation’
or ‘givenness’, rather than  présence and for him the ‘icon’ that is the life,
death  and  Resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ  is  instead  present  in  the  gift  of
Eucharist (1991, p.151).
The problem is, as Benson has already noted (2002, p.193), that all
icons tend to become idols and the line Marion draws between the two is not
always  clear.  Despite  its  imaginative  and  striking  nature,  Marion  has
reinterpreted his relationship to Heidegger in his own mature writings. For
Marion every face is given as an icon, a face that reflects our own gaze, ‘not
to  be  seen,  but  to  be  venerated’  (1991,  p.19),  and  he  will  argue  –  in
conversation  with  Levinas  –  beyond  the  central  paradox  of  Husserlian
phenomenology  by  means  of  the  notion  of  the  revelatory  saturated
phenomenon which reflects to that beyond its appearance.
The Gift of Death
Heidegger presumed that an endless life would be both unmanageable and
care-less, with no way of deciding what to do or when to do it. Despite the
seeming  lack  of  empirical  certainty  of  our  own  death,  the  progressive
contraction  of  our  choices  towards  a  single  possibility  is  clear.  Thus,
Heidegger focuses on one’s own death – even time ends with one’s own
death (2000, p.378), a claim hard to reconcile with the inter-subjectivity of
Dasein’s essential being-with others, since they are unlikely to all die at the
same time as oneself.
Derrida noted (1995, p.46) how Levinas reproaches Heidegger both
over the fact that  Dasein is argued from the privileged position of its own
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death and that the death it gives is simple annihilation, such that the gift of
death is merely being-towards-death within the same familiar horizon of the
question of being. Derrida therefore points out that the death of the other –
or for the other – is that which
institutes our self and our responsibility, would correspond to a
more  originary  experience  than  the  comprehension  or
precomprehension of the sense of being. (1995, pp.47-48)
Indeed, for Derrida, it is the very otherness of the other that opens the space
of human ethics (1995, pp.107-110).
Marion  seemingly aware  of  this  distinction,  embraces  the  theme,
elaborating upon his earlier reflections on the face in Dieu Sans L’etre:
To envisage a face requires less to see it than to wait for it, to
wait for its accomplishment,  the terminal act,  the passage to
effectivity. That is why the truth of a life is only unveiled at its
last  instant:  ‘One must  not  reckon happy any mortal  before
seeing his last day and that he had attained the term of his life
without  undergoing suffering’ (Sophocles1).  That  is  why the
measure of friendship always remains duration. That is why to
love would mean to help the other person to the point of the
final instant of his or her death. And to see the other finally, in
truth, would mean, in the end, closing his or her eyes. (2002b,
pp.122-123)
This involves ‘consecrating myself to the infinite hermeneutic of the face,
according to space, and especially time’, which, entrusted to others, should
be pursued even after my own death. Marion inverts objective intentionality
with an intentionality of love: 
Only the  one  who has  lived  with  the  life  and  the  death  of
another person knows to what extent he or she does not know
that other. This one alone can therefore recognize the other as
the saturated phenomena par excellence, and consequently also
knows that it would take an eternity to envisage this saturated
phenomenon as  such  – not  constituting  it  as  an  object,  but
interpreting it in loving it. (2002b, p.126)
1 Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, II. 1528-30
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Like Grace for Plotinus,  beauty is not an inherent quality of the face but
something that  happens to it  and the saturated phenomenon is a constant
revelation. Marion writes: ‘“love is without end. It is only love in the infinity
of the loving (in der Unendlichkeit des Liebens)” (2002b, pp.126-127).2 The
face of the other person compels me to believe in my own eternity, like a
need of reason or, what comes back to the same thing, as the condition of its
infinite hermeneutic.’ 
Givenness should leave aside that which it affects and receives it. If
death were named as the event that suppresses every recipient of givenness,
one must conclude that in contrast to the nothing, death can suspend and
break  givenness  because  it  does  not  fall  under  the  latter’s  authority.
However,  Marion  suggests  that  its  relation  with  death  is  much  more
complex: 
The  mere  fact  that  one  can,  at  least  in  words,  ‘give’  and
‘receive’ death already suggests  this.  What  is  not  –  death –
could still happen to him who would disappear on account of
the fact of his  having welcomed this  inverted gift (which is
not). (2002a, p.56)
Is this just ‘a word game without conceptual justification’ (2002a, p.56), as
Marion himself  puts it?  His answer is no, if one admits after Heidegger
(2000,  p.307)  that  death  determines  Dasein as  the  ‘possibility  of
impossibility’,  and  he  draws  two  arguments  from  Heidegger’s
characterisation of authentic Being-toward-death:
anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and
brings  it  face  to  face  with  the  possibility  of  being  itself,
primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude,  but  of being
itself,  rather,  is  an  impassioned  freedom towards  death –  a
freedom which  has  been  released  from the  Illusions  of  the
2 E Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923-24): Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phanomenologischen
Reduktion, Hua. VII, ed. Rudolf Boehm, The Hague: Martnius Nijhoff, 1959, §29, p.14
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‘they’,  and  which  is  factical,  certain  of  itself,  and  anxious.
(2000, p.311)
Firstly, that death still remains for us (as Dasein) a real possibility and not
nullity; in fact the possibility  par excellence since it fixes the event of an
ultimate impossibility, one absolutely certain although undetermined and all
the more certain because it is undetermined. Moreover, since (as inescapable
possibility) death only affects  Dasein it defines its own most possibility –
not that of a worldly being to be won or avoided nor that of the self to be
maintained,  but  instead  the  possibility  of  the  transcendence  to  be
accomplished of  this being,  Dasein,  in  opposition to all  other  beings.  In
effect,  the  possibility  of  death  accomplishes  the  transcendence  in  and
through itself of Being over being as a whole.
Death  is  therefore  no  longer  a  non-event  that  would  destroy the
conditions of its reception by manifesting itself – when it happens ‘I am still
there to receive it because it appears well before I disappear’. It only appears
as  ‘a  possibility  that  is  first  because  last,  one  that  precedes  my all  my
actualities, rendering them only possible’ (Marion, 2002a, p.57). If death has
possibility and  actuality as  its  mode of  givenness,  the fact  that  it  is  not
actually present does not thereby imply that it is not for us, but rather that it
is  indeed for us as  not being (actual),  but as  pure possible.  Death is  not
being (having to actually  be in order  to be) but pure possibility at  every
moment and every direction and as such it can exert itself over us without
being or ceasing to be for us.
Marion thus refers to an Epicurean city without walls that for him
defines the openness of  Dasein – as radical possibility death accomplishes
nothing less than an intentional exposure, thereby opening our world and
therefore finally givenness itself. Death is given to myself and gives me to
myself as the possibility par excellence – thus Heidegger is describing the
phenomenological  essence  of  death,  authentic  being-toward-death  rather
than death itself (2000, p.284). It is not a matter of one event among and
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subsequent to all the others that happen to Dasein, putting an end to them,
but Dasein’s original entry into its mode of being – that of pure possibility
without  subsistence  or  usefulness.  As  originary possibility  and  authentic
being-toward-death, death is given to  Dasein, ‘not as a final blow, but as
send-off’ (Marion, 2002a, p.58). Death, at least as this  pure possibility, is
given to Dasein for as long as its life and even as its life itself (also given as
pure possibility). For Marion this is the clearest and most visible account of
givenness: Dasein’s ultimate determination as being oriented toward death.
However,  it  could  be  argued  that  if  death  is  the  possibility  of
impossibility, it  only opens as possibility in order to suspend every other
possibility, giving, therefore, nothing but the suspension of every given and
in the end nothing. Givenness therefore encounters its limit.
Marion suggests otherwise. ‘[I]f death manifests the suspension of
all possibility it does not in fact give little or nothing; it gives impossibility’
(2002a,  p.58). As the gift  of impossibility, death gives the experience of
finitude  as  an  unsurpassable  existential  determination  of  Dasein –  such
absolute impossibility only becomes accessible to us in the form of being-
toward-death.  As  a  possibility  becomes  actual  the  possibility  of
impossibility remains inaccessible.
This, for Marion, is now verified in  la mort d’autrui. Often it only
illumines the factual interruption of life by an accident lacking ontological
reason,  one  that  reinforces  the  lazy belief  of  those  left  behind  that  life
continues and death – whilst actual in the case of others – ‘is still neither
actual nor even possible’ for them (2002a, p.58). The actual death of others
opens no access to their death and ‘closes access to my own possible death,
attracting me to the very degree to which it  closes  the possibility of my
death’ (2002a, p.58). So in between the actual death of others as ‘a mute
fact’  and  my  death  as  ‘the  possibility  of  impossibility’  the  modes  of
givenness of the Ich transcending its ontic grounds – what Marion calls ‘the
free play of a pure possibility’ – are at stake, rather than the mere absence of
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a  recipient  of  givenness  or  the  ‘deficiency of  worldly actuality’  (2002a,
p.58).
Marion finds confirmation of this  in our invocation of death as a
privileged phenomenon of life in poetry, hymn and Scripture. It then seems
obvious  to  him that  there  we  understand  our  own  death  in  ‘short  pure
possibility’ and its ‘ungraspable, protean and haunting nature’ encourages
the  anxieties,  fears  and therapies  that  constitute  the  ‘everyday pathos  of
death’  (2002a,  p.59).  In  the  absolute  impossibility  which  actual  death
manifests,  my death is  made more accessible as possibility and therefore
given without measure:
Death – nothing escapes it, but it does not escape givenness,
not just because one can ‘give the gift of death,’ but above all
because it gives itself on its own […] [it] does not steal from
givenness that which (or he who) could receive it; it inscribes
it (or him or her) forever within the horizon of givenness
(2002a, p.59).
In this anxious relation between death and abandonment, the absence of the
giver is not an obstacle, but a path towards Him and one that, for Marion, is
travelled sacramentally through the liturgy of the church, both as the present
Christ and as memento mori, an act of remembrance for a dead leader.
Death, Saturated
For  Marion,  Jesus  Christ  appears  as  an  absolute  phenomenon,  one  that
‘annuls all relation because it saturates every possible horizon into which
relation might introduce it’ (2002a, p.238). It does this because its ‘moment’
escapes the time of the world (such that salvation is seen in terms of an
unforeseeable  event),  its  figure  the  space  of  the  ‘earth’  (in  terms of  the
unbearable event) – because his kingdom is simply not of this earth’ he can
only appear in it disfigured (2002a, p.239).
Thus the God that is crossed out by the sign of the crucified uses the
sign of the trace to answer ‘a question of saturation pertaining to the flesh’
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(2002a, p.239). The death of Christ offers the apex of his visibility, such that
we are able to claim that, truly, this was the son of God (Matthew 27:54).
‘Only the flesh suffers, dies and therefore can live’ (Marion, 2002a, p.239).
This comment echoes one made by Rahner affirming the ‘identity between
the experience of the spirit and participation in the victorious death of Jesus,
in which alone the real success of our death is experienced’ (1984, pp.205-
206).  Crucially,  although  this  seems  to  imply  that  it  is  our  vicarious
participation in the Passion which establishes the limits of Dasein, Marion
suggests (2002a, pp.159-173) that an event is only inadequately given and
cannot be the site of the disclosure necessary for participation.
The paradox of the flesh consists in ‘the fact that it affects itself by
itself. It also manifests itself without having to be inscribed in any relation
[…] in an absolute mode, outside or beyond any horizon’ (2002a, p.239).
The saturated phenomenon of Christ assumes this paradox of the flesh and
avoids either docetic or kenotic error by always ‘subverting the supposedly
unique  horizon  of  phenomenality,  thereby  demanding  a  never  definite
plurality of horizons […] indicated perfectly by a similar formulation in the
two final chapters of John: “Jesus did still more signs and others in the sight
of his disciples,  but these are not  written in this book” (John 20:30-31)’
(2002a, p.239). So, following John 21:25, Marion can therefore claim that
‘[t]he world cannot welcome the writings that would describe what Christ
did’ (2002a, p.239), since it is clear that:
the  acts  of  Christ,  even  reduced  to  writings,  exceed  the
horizons  of this world,  are not  of this  world,  demand other
horizons  and other worlds.  This principle of the plurality of
worlds,  or  rather  horizons,  governs  all  dimensions  of  the
phenomenality of Christ’s flesh. (2002a, p.239)
With  Scripture  (John  19:20)  thus  saturated,  such  that  even  four  gospels
cannot adequately tell the story, Marion  must return to the hermeneutic of
the  Face  and the  fleshly paradox  commemorated  in  its  only site  of  full
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presence, the gift of Eucharist (Luke 22:19); if it we could grasp it fully, it
would not be a gift.
Concluding thoughts
The  documents  of  Vatican  II  were  influenced  enormously  by  the
phenomenological method of Husserl, which was widely influential in post-
war  Europe;  its  bearing  upon  the  post-war  theological  development  and
pastoral mission of the Catholic community is immense. The pastoral wishes
of  Pope  John  XXIII were  implemented  by theologians  and bishops  who
adopted  the  phenomenological  approach  as  one  that  they  considered
effective both theologically and pastorally in understanding and conversing
with the modern world (Kobler, 1985, p.ix).
It  is  love  –  conceived  as  gift  –  that  enabled  this  move  beyond
metaphysics  and  ontological  difference.  But  amid  discussion  of  the  gift
(Caputo & Scanlon, 1999, pp.54-78) among the ‘apostles of the impossible’
there remains  the puzzle  of  how to approach such a  dazzling  God. This
eagerness to  dépasser la métaphysique by elevating Heidegger too readily
equates  metaphysics  with  philosophy (this  same  assumption  is  made  by
Milbank (1997) and overlooks its possibility to think ontological difference
or  articulate  un  possible  rationnel.  Marion  (2005)  believes  that  we  can
address these questions through discussion of ‘the privilege of unknowing’,
an  Augustinian  concern  and  a  phrase  that  also  appears  in  the  work  of
Rahner.
Marion’s  greatest  strength  has  always  been  in  the  quality  of  his
interlocutors  and  his  work  reflects  the  complex  interplay  between  the
traditional Christian topics of hope and death and contemporary arguments
on meaning, symbol and ritual. 
In  Étant Donné,  he has successfully removed the divine gift  from
causality  but  crucially  not  from  debt,  and  the  gift  of  death  –  the  very
givenness of human existence – in fact leaves its recipient indebted until his
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or her last moment and locates him or her within an economy of exchange, a
debt which can only be repaid liturgically via a eucharistic move upwards
towards the donor (God) and outwards amongst the community, a move that
perpetuates  the  original  giving.  We  are  therefore  encouraged  to  move
towards  the  stranger,  just  as  we  are  encountered  by  that  most  radical
stranger, death.
This locates the Eucharist as the site of human hope and recollection
of the life, death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ, our churches ‘destined to
receive  the  eucharistic  presence  of  the  risen  Face’  (2002b,  p.81).  The
Christian hope is its memory and that memory is one of a death: a death that
always gazes toward a resurrection (Rahner 2000, pp.14-15). The God of
Marion’s  Christian  revelation  is  the  God whom no-one  can  see  without
dying, a look that we desire unto death (2002b, pp.80-81).
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